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NEVADA PUBLIC POLICY AND HIGHER
EDUCATION: THE ROLES OF THE
LEGISLATURE AND THE BOARD




In June of 1864, Nevada elected delegates to its second constitutional con-
vention in two years. In September of that same year, the state’s constitution
was ratified by the people and, by the end of October, President Lincoln issued
a proclamation making Nevada the thirty-sixth state in the Union.1 Nevada
made the transition from territory to statehood more rapidly than any of its
western counterparts.2 The adopted state constitution placed almost unique
emphasis on, and provided an entire article of the constitution governing, the
subject of education.3 Education was bound to be a central area of attention,
given the enactment of the Morrill Act of 1862, which required specific areas
of instruction in public universities if states were to qualify for federal financial
assistance.4 Since the constitution thus required the establishment of a state
University governed by a Board of Regents, it has been suggested that it forbids
legislative creation of any other tax-supported schools of higher education that
are not governed by the same Board of Regents. Indeed, it has even been con-
tended that it perhaps forbids legislative creation of any schools of higher edu-
cation without the consent of the University Board of Regents. It is the purpose
of this article to provide a critique of these conclusions and to contend, instead,
that the state’s legislature holds the power to establish additional schools of
higher education in the state, as well as the authority to establish and set forth
how such schools will be governed.
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, Boyd Law School, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
** Associate with Ramirez Group, publisher of The Nevada View blog.
1 See MICHAEL W. BOWERS, THE NEVADA STATE CONSTITUTION 16 (2011); ELEANORE
BUSHNELL, THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION: ORIGIN AND GROWTH 57 (rev. ed. 1968).
2 BUSHNELL, supra note 1, at 19. Nevada had been made a territory just three years earlier.
Id.
3 See NEV. CONST. art. XI.
4 BUSHNELL, supra note 1, at 45; DON W. DRIGGS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA: A COMMENTARY 60 (1961) (observing that the constitution named as fields of
study the very ones that the Morrill Act required for eligibility for federal benefits).
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER
A. A Time-Honored Principle
It is crucial to underline the general understanding that the legislatures of
the states are, unlike Congress, bodies that hold “general” or “plenary” powers.
This has been true from the beginning. The drafters of the early state constitu-
tions “assumed that government had all power except for specific prohibitions
contained in a bill of rights.”5 Down to the present, state courts consistently
reaffirm this principle. A “state constitution’s provisions are not grants of
power but instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people
of a state exercised through its Legislature.”6 Hence the legislatures “may enact
any legislation that the state constitution does not prohibit.”7 It is thus plain that
the Nevada state legislature holds “broad inherent powers beyond those specifi-
cally delegated by the state’s constitution.”8
So all state legislatures have “plenary power excepting what the people
chose to withhold.”9 This “virtual omnipotence stemmed from the operation of
popular sovereignty at the state level,” since as “the creature of the supreme
power—the people,” the legislature “must [only] be limited by the [state’s]
Constitution.”10 Some state courts, including the Supreme Court of Nevada,
have gone so far as to say that the Legislature possesses power that is “unlim-
ited except by the Federal Constitution, and such restrictions as are expressly
placed upon it by the fundamental law of the State.”11 On other occasions, the
Nevada Supreme Court has stated the basic point more mildly: “the legislature
is supreme in its field of making the law so long as it does not contravene some
expressed or necessarily implied limitation appearing in the constitution
itself.”12 In a commentary within an annotated Nevada constitution, Don W.
5 DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY
IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 60 (1980).
6 Bd. of Dir. of the La. Recovery Dist. v. All Taxpayers of La., 529 So. 2d 384, 387 (La.
1988).
7 Id. See also State ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P.2d 844, 850 (Kan. 1978) (“Where
the constitutionality of a statute is involved, the question presented is, therefore, not whether
the act is authorized by the constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby.”).
8 BOWERS, supra note 1, at 59.
9 Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Obser-
vations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 945,
965 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). Accord BOWERS, supra note 1, at 59 (the only
limits to the legislature’s “plenary power’” are “those specified by the constitution”).
10 Fritz, supra note 9. The Nevada Supreme Court has thus stated that the legislative “power
is indeed very broad, and, except where limited by Federal or State Constitutional provi-
sions, that power is practically absolute.” Galloway v. Truesdell, 422 P.2d 237, 242 (Nev.
1967).
11 Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 283, 292 (Nev. 1869) (emphasis added). See David E. Bern-
stein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revisited: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 32 (2003) (some courts have said that legislatures can
“only be restrained by express constitutional provisions”).
12 King v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nev., 200 P.2d 221, 225 (Nev. 1948). Elsewhere the
court has concurred that language carrying a clear limiting principle can suffice to restrict
legislative power. Galloway, 422 P.2d at 242 (“Unless there are specific constitutional limi-
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Driggs underscored that “Nevada courts have ruled that the Legislature has
unlimited law-making authority within its jurisdiction, except when powers are
specifically denied it by the Federal Constitution or the State Constitution.”13
B. The Principle Applied to Nevada Education
The Nevada Constitution confirms in various ways that the Legislature, as
the basic policy-making entity in the state, was intended to be in charge of the
growth and development of education in the state, including higher education.14
In Section 1 of the Constitution’s education article, Article 11, it explicitly
states that the “legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion
of intellectual, literary, scientific, mining, mechanical, agricultural, and moral
improvements . . . .”15 The provision’s premise is that the named “improve-
ments” will be the yield of the Legislature’s establishment of public policies in
favor of education in these areas. This injunction to “encourage” and “promote”
education specifically extends to education in the areas of, inter alia,
“[a]griculture, [m]echanic[al] [arts], and [m]ining,” each a department to be
included in the State University mandated in Section 4.16 An implication of this
injunction to use “all suitable means” to promote these ends is that the Legisla-
ture is empowered in general to determine the higher educational matters that
are most crucial: the institutions required, the essential management programs
and policies, and the financial support essential to pursuing the state’s educa-
tional mission.17
tations to the contrary, statutes are to be construed in favor of the legislative power.”)
(emphasis added).
13 DRIGGS, supra note 4, at 31. See Gibson, 5 Nev. at 291–94.
14 See NEV. CONST. art. XI.
15 Id. at art. XI, § 1 (emphasis added). There is also every reason to believe that the conven-
tion that brought us the Nevada constitution would have understood, and acted on the
assumption, that the legislature holds plenary powers. There were eleven lawyers who were
delegates to the convention, and the convention president was J. Neeley Johnson, a former
governor of California and later a member of the Nevada Supreme Court. Patricia D. Caffer-
ata, Back Story: Second Constitutional Convention - Part One, NEV. LAW., Feb. 2013, at 54,
54, available at http://nvbar.org/articles/content/back-story-second-constitutional-conven
tion-part-one. This is a group that would have understood that if the Nevada constitution was
to limit legislative power, it would need to be clearly manifested.
16 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 4 states: “The Legislature shall provide for the establishment of a
State University which shall embrace departments for Agriculture, Mechanic Arts, and Min-
ing to be controlled by a Board of Regents whose duties shall be prescribed by law.”
17 And, indeed, Article XI mandates the public funding of both the university and common
schools established in the state. Id. at art. XI, § 3. The legislature, moreover, can rely not
only on the presumption in favor of legislative power, but also on “the duty of courts to
uphold statutes passed by the legislature, unless their unconstitutionality clearly appears
. . . .” State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 4 P. 735, 737 (Nev. 1884). See, e.g., King, 200 P.2d at
225 (“[E]very presumption is in favor of [a statute’s] constitutionality and every doubt must
be resolved in its favor.”); State ex rel. York v. Turpen, 681 P.2d 763, 766 (Okla. 1984)
(stating that “it will not be presumed that the members of [the legislature] . . . will enact or
attempt to enact legislative measures that they know are violative of the state Constitution or
of the federal Constitution”; a law is “clothed with the presumption that it is a valid enact-
ment and with its validity the executive and judicial departments have nothing to do, until it
becomes the duty of these respective departments to participate in the construction or
enforcement of such statute”).
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As already noted, the Nevada Constitution itself does not merely empower
the Legislature to create a university or universities; instead, the Legislature is
commanded to establish (“shall provide for”) a “State University.”18 And this
duty, imposed in Section 4 of Article 11, indicates that there is a clearly estab-
lished, if implicit, limitation on discretionary legislative power. The Legislature
must, as a constitutional matter, establish a State University, and so lacks the
legal discretion to choose against such an establishment. Similarly, the same
section (§ 4) requires the establishment of a Board of Regents, and specifies
that it will “[control]” the University, consistent with the duties that “shall be
prescribed by [l]aw.”19 Since the Constitution requires the Legislature to estab-
lish the Board to control the University, that body lacks discretion to establish
an alternative method of governing the University.20 Even then, of course, the
Legislature retains authority to enact rules and regulations prescribing the
Board of Regent’s duties.21 The Nevada Constitution goes even further, by
specifying that the University is to include three identified departments—to
teach agriculture, mechanic arts, and mining.22
The well-known history indicates that “[t]he fields of study mentioned in
this section are the ones which the states were specifically instructed to include
in state college curricula in order to be eligible for federal benefits under the
Morrill Act passed by Congress in 1862.”23 The federal law was enacted just
two years prior to ratification of the Nevada Constitution.24 A central purpose
of Article 11, then, was to establish a State University that met the legal
requirements to qualify for federal funds. Given the centrality of this fairly
limited reason for quite literally requiring the Legislature to “establish” a State
University—and in light of the presumption in favor of legislative power—it
follows that the Legislature is the supreme policy-maker with respect to state
education. Thus, the same section that requires the establishment of a State
University that is “to be controlled by a Board of Regents,” also states that the
Board’s “duties shall be prescribed by law.”25
The Nevada Constitution, moreover, does not in any way empower the
Board of Regents to determine what institutions of higher education, in addition
to the State University, if any, will be established or funded by the Legislature.
Nothing in the constitution states or implies that the Legislature’s general
power to establish educational policy, or to determine the extent of the state’s
18 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 4. The attorney general’s office actually claimed that the “Consti-
tution of the State of Nevada created a tax-supported State University in order to provide for
the need of higher education in this State.” University of Nevada, Board of Regents; Respon-
sibility for Tax-Supported Higher Education, 1968 Op. Att’y Gen. 479 (1968) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter AG on Board of Regents]. But there is a chasm between constitutionally
establishing an institution and merely providing that a government entity was required to
establish it.
19 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
20 For some of the limits this imposes on legislative power, see infra notes 78–88 and
accompanying text.
21 See NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 4 & 7.
22 Id. at art. XI, § 4.
23 DRIGGS, supra note 4. See also BUSHNELL, supra note 1, at 45.
24 See NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 8 (providing that “all the proceeds of the public lands” made
available by the 1862 act should be spent “for the benefit” of the three named departments).
25 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
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commitment to higher education (including establishing higher education insti-
tutions), is in any way restricted beyond requiring the creation of a State Uni-
versity. Moreover, the authority of the Regents is restricted by its obligation to
comply with the duties set forth in legislation, and its power to “control” the
State University clearly does not extend to deciding or controlling either the
higher education policy or funding of the state, nor even to determining
whether additional institutions of higher education should be established by the
Legislature.
II. THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION EMPOWERS THE
LEGISLATURE TO ESTABLISH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND TO
DETERMINE THEIR GOVERNANCE
Another key to accurately construing the Nevada Constitution’s provisions
relating to education is set forth in the Sutherland treatise on statutory
interpretation:
A basic insight about the process of communication was given classic expression by
the Supreme Court of the United States when it declared that “the meaning of the
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is
framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it accord-
ing to its terms.” This generally means when the language of the statute is clear and
not unreasonable or illogical in its operation, the court may not go outside the statute
to give it a different meaning.26
Nevada embraces this predominant plain meaning principle: Its highest court
has stated that “[w]hen statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we do not
look beyond its plain meaning, and we give effect to its apparent intent from
the words used, unless that meaning was clearly not intended.”27 In practice,
courts thus strive to read a statute’s language “in a way that would not render
words or phrases superfluous or make a provision nugatory.”28 Nevada courts
thus state with pride that, “we have ‘consistently upheld the plain meaning of
the statutory scheme.’ ”29
A. Applying the Plain Meaning Principle
Applying the plain meaning principle, it is clear that the Nevada constitu-
tion creates a legislative duty to establish a State University, but it does not
include an express or implied prohibition on establishing additional institutions
of higher education, nor prescribe any particular method for controlling or gov-
erning such institutions. The text and history, as we have seen, supports the
plenary power of the Legislature over state education.30 Moreover, from Sec-
26 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 46:1, at 137–41 (7th ed. 2007).
27 Seput v. Lacayo, 134 P.3d 733, 735 (Nev. 2006). See also Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA,
255 P.3d 1281, 1285 (Nev. 2011) (“When the language in a provision is clear and unambigu-
ous, this court gives ‘effect to that meaning and will not consider outside sources beyond that
statute.’ ”) (quoting City of Reno v. Citizens for Cold Springs, 236 P.3d 10, 16 (Nev. 2010)).
28 Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc., 252 P.3d 206, 209 (Nev. 2011).
29 City of Las Vegas v. Evans, 301 P.3d 844, 846 (Nev. 2013).
30 See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. While the state university, widely called
the University of Nevada, was established in 1874, in Elko, it was moved to Reno in 1885—
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tion 3 through Section 8 of Article 11 of the Constitution, the State University
is referred to eight times, always in the singular and typically with the words
“State” and “University” written with initial capital letters. A clear implication
is that it is the State University that must be established by the Legislature, and
the University must be governed by a Board of Regents. The constitution does
not address in any way whether additional institutions of higher education, such
as the College of Southern Nevada (CSN), might be established, or how such
schools must be governed if established by the Legislature.
As already noted, the constitution does not clearly deny—either explicitly
or implicitly—the Legislature’s normal powers to establish public policy for
the state, including authority to establish additional institutions of higher educa-
tion. Indeed, as we have seen, Section 1 of the Education Article calls for the
Legislature to use “all suitable means” to promote various types of education at
all levels.31 Section 9 reinforces this conclusion and confirms the Legislature’s
possession of its standard powers. Section 9 provides that sectarian instruction
shall not be “imparted or tolerated in any school or university that may be
established under this Constitution.”32 Absent this prohibition, it would be the
Legislature with power to determine whether higher education instruction could
or could not include sectarian instruction—whatever preliminary decision
might be made by the Regents under their authority to “control” the University
of Nevada.33
B. Plain Meaning and Legislative Power Brought Together
Both the plain meaning rule and the presumption in favor of legislative
power are powerfully illustrated in contrasting cases where the legislature did,
and did not, invade another institution’s constitutional authority. In King v.
Board of Regents, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the state legislature
invaded the authority granted by the constitution to the Board of Regents when
it created an advisory Board of Regents that would be nominated by the Board
of Regents specified in the constitution and approved by the Legislature.34 It
thus ruled that the trial court had erred in refusing to grant an injunction prohib-
iting the Regents from nominating the advisory board as provided in the act.35
The court reasoned that positive constitutional directions contain an implication
a decision made by the state legislature. See Melanie Robbins, Campus Experiences Burst of
Rapid, Transformational Growth, NEV.: SILVER & BLUE, Fall 2010, at 2, 2, available at
http://www.unr.edu/silverandblue/archive/2010/fall/NSB_Fall_2010_ONLINE.pdf.
31 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
32 NEV. CONST. art XI, § 9.
33 Section 9, moreover, clearly assumes, by referring to “any school or university” that the
University of Nevada might not be the only “university,” or even the only school of higher
education, in Nevada. Indeed, this language strongly implies that more higher education
institutions “may be established” under the Constitution by the authority of the legislature.
Yet despite this clear implication, nothing in Section 9, or elsewhere, states or implies how
any other schools or universities will be governed or controlled. Especially given that Sec-
tion 4 only requires a particular form of management for a single entity—the State Univer-
sity—the authority to establish additional institutions was clearly intended to include
authority to set up their governance. Id. (emphasis added).
34 King v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nev., 200 P.2d 221, 227 (Nev. 1948).
35 Id. at 223.
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against things contrary to them, or which would frustrate or disappoint the pur-
pose of the directions. Here the “advisory” board would perform virtually all of
the functions of the constitutional board, with only a legislative proviso that the
“advisory” board’s determinations would not be controlling.36 The challenged
law had the prohibited effect of adding new duties foreign to the office—nomi-
nating an advisory board—and otherwise changing, modifying, or altering con-
stitutional powers and functions.37
Contrast King with the court’s 1981 decision in Board of Regents v.
Oakley.38 There, the Nevada Board of Regents maintained that the constitution
had granted it “virtual autonomy” in operating the system of higher education,
with the consequence that the Board could apply its own longstanding
mandatory retirement age policy that contradicted a more recent state law that
prohibited age discrimination in hiring and retention employment practices in
state agencies. The issue presented required the Nevada Supreme Court to
determine the scope of the executive-administrative duties and powers of the
Board of Regents and the scope of the Legislature’s powers as the chief legal
policymaker in the state. The opinion in Oakley clarified that the “autonomy”
of the Board of Regents was limited to administering the university system and
had no bearing on the legislative authority to establish and implement a binding
statewide principle of employment non-discrimination.39
The court reasoned that states may impose on state governing boards the
same duties they impose on county or municipal boards, which could include
the same obligations to make hiring and retention decisions on the basis of
merit and fitness rather than on immaterial factors such as race, sex, creed,
national origin, or age.40 King thus did not mean that the Board of Regents is
“free from all legislative regulation,” but only that the legislature could not
directly interfere “with essential functions of the University.”41 When issues of
public policy go well beyond the management of the State University required
to be created by Article 11, Section 4 of the constitution, and extend to broader
questions of the higher education policies and needs of the state, they are mat-
ters to be resolved by the state legislature.
C. Countering an Alternative Construction
At least one published commentary, written as a state attorney general
opinion, has suggested that Article 11, Section 5, supplies an implied prohibi-
tion on legislative power that forbids the legislature to establish schools of
higher education beyond the State University, or at least to create tax-supported
36 Id. at 225.
37 Id. at 226–27.
38 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nev. Sys. v. Oakley, 637 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Nev. 1981).
39 Id. at 1200. One might wonder if the Board’s “virtual autonomy” rationale stemmed in
part from the 1968 attorney general opinion’s misattribution to the King decision that the
state constitution made the Board “a ruler of an independent province beyond the law-mak-
ing authority of the Legislature.” AG on Board of Regents, supra note 18 (misquoting King).
See infra notes 72–73 (describing misattribution).
40 Oakley, 637 P.2d at 1200.
41 Id. 
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schools of higher education that are not governed by the State Board of
Regents.42 Section 5 reads:
The Legislature shall have power to establish Normal schools, and such different
grades of schools, from the primary department to the University, as in their discre-
tion they may deem necessary, and all Professors in said University, or Teachers in
said Schools of whatever grade, shall be required to take and subscribe to the oath as
prescribed in Article Fifteenth of this Constitution.43
This grant of power, clarifying legislative authority to establish both “normal
schools” and other grades of schools up to the University, does not purport to
prohibit the establishment of additional schools. Yet this same commentator44
asserted that the section’s “restrictive import” is “obvious,”45 concluding that
the Legislature “does not have the authority to establish grades or institutions
on a university level.”46 Rather than prohibiting the establishment of additional
schools, Section 5 simply confirms that the Legislature holds an expansive
authority—consistent with its general policy-making role—to establish any
schools and grades from primary school to the University that it “may deem
necessary.”47 There is, however, no prohibition, express or implied, on the
establishment of additional college-level schools. There was no need for one.
The framers of the state constitution referenced “the University,” as previ-
ously noted, mainly to ensure eligibility for federal benefits under the Morrill
Act by requiring the creation of the University of Nevada.48 Those framers only
referenced the University, no doubt, because it was the only higher education
school before them, and Section 5 was simply added to clarify that the constitu-
tionally required educational system did not foreclose establishing additional
normal schools or “grades” of schools. This specific grant of authority to estab-
lish additional schools in no way suggests the lack of such authority as to
others, and the referenced commentary does not offer any reason—beyond
labeling its conclusion “obvious”—that makes such a construction plausible.
42 The attorney general opinion concluded that the legislature “is precluded” from establish-
ing “tax-supported college-level institutions governed by a body other than the Board of
Regents of the University of Nevada.” AG on Board of Regents, supra note 18. Even more
broadly, this opinion at one point asserted that “the authority to establish a technical institute
program offering courses primarily on a college level was in the Board of Regents of the
University of Nevada.” Id. The attorney general’s office, then, at one point asserted that it is
only the Board of Regents that can “establish” new and additional institutions of higher
education in the state. Id.
43 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
44 This state attorney general opinion is referred to as the work of a “commentator” inas-
much as such opinions are not considered to be legal precedent. See infra notes 60–62 and
accompanying text.
45 AG on Board of Regents, supra note 18.
46 Id. Given this claim, it is compelling that, as we will see, the Legislature has in fact
established other higher education institutions—not merely new portions of a single State
University—and that these steps have received no objection. This probably explains why it
is that advocates of an implied limitation on the legislature power as to higher education
refer equivocally to its content, sometimes suggesting that it only prohibits state funding of
institutions not controlled by the State Board of Regents and sometimes suggesting that the
legislature cannot independently decide that the state needs an additional institution to the
State University. See infra notes 51, 53–54 and accompanying text.
47 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
48 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
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The referenced commentary, moreover, simply ignores what was just
shown, that Section 9 prohibits sectarian instruction in “any school or Univer-
sity” that “may be established under this Constitution.”49 In contrast to the
pervasive references to “the University,” here the constitution itself refers to
the potential for additional universities to be established. Little wonder, then,
that when the Nevada Legislature established the College of Southern Nevada
(CSN), to use one example, no one objected that the Legislature lacked the
authority to create that institution of higher education.50 To read Section 5 as an
implied prohibition of alternatively governed schools of higher education,
based on the requirement that the University be “controlled” by a Board of
Regents, makes no more sense than inferring from the constitutional require-
ment of establishing a State University an implied prohibition on establishing
any additional schools of higher education at all—at least not without the clear
consent of the State University. In fact, all too often, the first contention leads
to the quite implausible second.
This would mean that the Nevada Constitution would be read as forbid-
ding the legislative establishment of CSN and the rest of the community and/or
public junior colleges, absent the concurrence of the University of Nevada and
its Regents. And, indeed, this same commentator asserts, based supposedly on
the language of Section 5, that the Legislature “does not have the authority to
establish grades or institutions on a university level.”51 The reasoning is that
the specifications in Section 5, and its reference to establishing schools and
“different grades of schools from the primary department to the University”
means that the Legislature lacks the power to create schools at the university
level.52 This commentator sometimes appears only to assert that the Legislature
cannot establish “tax-supported college-level institutions governed by a body
other than the Board of Regents of the University of Nevada.”53 But sometimes
it offers the much broader assertion that tax supported schools of higher educa-
tion must be “established and controlled by the Board of Regents.”54
49 See supra notes 32–33.
50 CSN has operated under three names since its founding in 1971—Clark Country Commu-
nity College, Community College of Southern Nevada, and its current CSN—and it is one of
several two-year higher education institutions that combine with Nevada’s three four-year
schools. See Alumni Relations, CSN, https://www.csn.edu/pages/708.asp (last visited Apr.
22, 2014); NHSE Institutions, NSHE, http://system.nevada.edu/Nshe/index.cfm/nshe-institu
tions (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). Similarly, the Desert Research Institute, established in
1959, provides opportunities for post-graduate work and functions within the state’s Univer-
sity System. BUSHNELL, supra note 1, at 16. It has operated as a “multiple-purpose research
organization with a statewide operation.” Id.  It again defies the assertion that the legislature
lacks authority to establish additional institutions of higher education.
51 AG on Board of Regents, supra note 18.
52 Id. In the same memorandum, this commentator actually asserts that “the authority to
establish a technical institute program offering courses primarily on a college level was in
the Board of Regents of the University of Nevada . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
53 Id. (emphasis added).
54 Id. (emphasis added). See also supra note 46 and accompanying text. The idea that only
the Board of Regents of the University holds power to “establish” a program of higher
education is preposterous.
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III. WHEN CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT IS READ IN LIGHT OF THE PURPOSES
REVEALED IN ITS HISTORY, IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THE LEGISLATURE WAS
GRANTED POWER OVER HIGHER EDUCATION
A. A State Attorney General Opinion Does not Create Legal Precedent
That Binds Courts or Public Officials
Bushnell recounted that when a community college was established in
Elko in 1967, which was to have its own governing board, an issue raised was
whether a tax-supported institution of higher education could be established by
the legislature and governed by another entity than the University Board of
Regents.55 The issue did not trouble the legislature, which considered in a spe-
cial session whether to appropriate money for the Elko College; it declined,
however, to make the appropriation at that time.56 It was in this setting that the
Attorney General’s office, based on a request by the University Board of
Regents, issued an opinion stating “[i]f college level courses are taught, the
school is functioning on a university level and, if tax supported, should be
established and controlled by the Board of Regents through the University
facilities.”57 While it has become commonplace for commentators to cite this
opinion as though it stated the established law,58 Professor Bushnell noted that
the Attorney General Opinion (AGO) itself had “differed from one advanced
earlier by the Legislative Counsel Bureau, which averred that community col-
leges could be established by the Legislature and controlled by the State Board
of Education.”59
It is well established that state attorney general opinions are not binding
law that control later decisions by courts or compel compliance by state offi-
cials. Such opinions are given weight by courts only when it is determined that
they correctly construe and apply governing law, whether enacted or court-
created.60 If an attorney general opinion states that an act is unconstitutional, it
is advisory only, and thus is not binding on state officers until such a holding is
55 BUSHNELL, supra note 1, at 17.
56 Id. 
57 AG on Board of Regents, supra note 18.
58 See, e.g., BOWERS, supra note 1, at 131 (stating that community colleges are adminis-
tered by the Board of Regents because “the legislature is prohibited by this section [§4] from
creating a separate body for that purpose,” and citing the 1968 AG Opinion).
59 BUSHNELL, supra note 1, at 17. The attorney general opinion itself acknowledged as
much, noting that this contrasting view was “issued” to “the Governor’s Committee on Edu-
cation and the Superintendent of Public Instruction.” AG on Board of Regents, supra note
18. In addition, the attorney general opinion not only rejected those opinions as “legally
unsound,” but also objected that the Legislative Counsel Bureau “is acting outside the scope
of its authority in giving legal advice to the executive branch of the government.” Id. It may
well be that the attorney general’s office is the typical body to give “legal advice to the
executive branch,” but any implication that the Legislative Counsel Bureau acted improperly
in stating its construction of state law is indefensible, and the analysis in this article explains
why it is the attorney general’s view that is “legally unsound.” Since the Legislative Counsel
Bureau opinions are not published, this memorandum will be limited to analyzing the attor-
ney general’s critique of the bureau’s legal reasoning.
60 Coffin v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420, 425 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
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confirmed in court.61 Nevada follows this general rule, plainly holding that
“[o]pinions of the Attorney General are not binding legal authority or prece-
dent.”62 Even so, it will be useful to analyze the AGO to determine whether it
reaches sound conclusions in construing the Nevada Constitution.
B. When the Text is Read in Light of Historical Purpose, it Clearly Does
not Restrict The Legislature’s Presumptive Policymaking Role on
Higher Education nor Grant Conflicting Power to the
University’s Board of Regents
As we have seen, courts in general, including those here in Nevada, often
state that they follow the plain meaning rule. They almost equally often distin-
guish between being bound by a text’s plain meaning and being beholden to an
unduly literal reading of text—especially when it produces an absurd result. In
a well-known formulation, the Supreme Court said that the rule should be
applied when the “definite meaning” it reveals “involves no absurdity, nor any
contradiction of other parts of the instrument.”63 So in performing statutory
construction, courts sometimes necessarily elaborate more completely, and
even qualify, the plain meaning rule. In the classic restatement of the plain
meaning rule, found in Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, which
was quoted earlier in this article64—it states that the rule governs construction
of text when “the statute is clear and not unreasonable or illogical in its opera-
tion.”65 So in the real world, courts will often take the position stated by the
Nevada Supreme Court when it said that the “words in a statute should be given
their plain meaning unless this violates the spirit of the act.”66
When students of a legal enactment confront text that points away from
their preferred policy position, a common strategy is to contend that the histori-
cal evidence concerning legislative purpose or intent shows that the apparent
textual meaning should be abandoned in favor of a conclusion that serves a
preferred outcome. The classic formulation of this principle, validly applied, is
found in Lord Coke’s analysis in Heydon’s Case.67 There the famous common
law judge offered the view that the greatest help for statutory construction is to
determine the “defect” or “mischief” found in the prior state of the law, the
“remedy” sought in the new enactment, and then to construe the language, if
possible, to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.68 The Nevada
61 State ex rel. York v. Turpen, 681 P.2d 763, 767 (Okla. 1984).
62 Blackjack Bonding v. City of Las Vegas Mun. Court, 14 P.3d 1275, 1279 (Nev. 2000).
Accord Goldman v. Bryan, 787 P.2d 372, 380 (Nev. 1990) (“[O]pinions of the attorney
general do not constitute binding legal authority or precedent.”).
63 Lake Cnty. v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889). When this is the case, of course, then
“neither the courts nor the legislature have the right to add to it or take from it.” Id.
64 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
65 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 26.
66 Redl v. Secretary of State, 85 P.3d 797, 799 (Nev. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).
67 Heydon’s Case, (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 637.
68 Id. at 638–39. Sometimes referred to as a “purposive” interpretive method, explication
and defense of this sort of approach can be found at some length in modern works by Profes-
sors Hart and Sacks and Reed Dickerson. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
(William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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Supreme Court has basically endorsed this interpretive approach when the situ-
ation warrants it. Stating the principle in the very spirit of Heydon’s Case, the
Nevada court has reasoned that “courts may determine legislative intent by
looking at the entire act and construing the statute in light of purposes underly-
ing the act.”69
This article has argued in favor of the view that the plain meaning of
Nevada’s constitutional text supports the Legislature’s authority to determine
the appropriate institutions of higher education needed in the State of Nevada,
as well as to determine how such institutions should be governed. Although
some public voices have offered a different reading of the Nevada constitu-
tional system, in this section we will reaffirm that plain meaning argument and
analyze arguments attempting to rely on historical evidence alleged to support a
construction presuming a far lesser legislative role and a more pronounced role
for the Board of Regents.
As previously noted, the State’s University was established by Section 4
of the Nevada Constitution’s Article 11, to provide the course work required by
the federal Morrill Act.70 The University of Nevada could easily be established,
and be governed by the State Board of Regents, without placing the entire State
system of higher education under the exclusive control of the Board. Nothing in
the Nevada Constitution grants the Board such exclusive control. To the extent
that the AGO suggested a power greater than the authority to administer the
University, consistent with the rules and policies established by the Legislature,
it is clearly wrong. Article 11, Section 4 specifically provides that the Board’s
“duties shall be prescribed by law.” That law would be enacted by the State’s
Legislature, in accordance with its conception of sound public policy in regulat-
ing the State’s schools. This is the same Legislature that in Sections 5 and 9 is
recognized as also having the discretion to establish schools, including univer-
sities, and which in general is the central policy-making body in the State.71
The 1968 AGO basically ignored the presumption in favor of legislative
power, while insisting that the constitutional convention had the purpose of
empowering the Board of Regents while constricting the Legislature. It is sig-
nificant by itself that one can read the AGO, which is six printed pages, and
never even encounter the idea that appropriate analysis of state constitutions
always begins with the presumption in favor of legislative power.72 The AGO
69 Goldman v. Bryan, 787 P.2d 372, 382 (1990) (citing Colello v. Adm’r Real Estate Div.,
683 P.2d 15 (1984)).
70 See supra note 4.
71 This is the reason it borders on the preposterous to suggest it is the Board of Regents,
rather than the State legislature, that is empowered to “establish” institutions of higher edu-
cation in Nevada. On the binding nature of plain meaning, see supra notes 26–29 and
accompanying text.
72 One might logically assume that a state’s attorney general’s office might frequently have
a preference for upholding and extending executive power. This assumption fits nicely here
inasmuch as the presumption in favor of legislative power is simply bypassed in the AGO. It
may also be relevant that the author of the AGO in this case, Daniel R. Walsh, also served at
this time, and for seven years, as the legal counsel for the University of Nevada System. If
one were a member of the Board of Regents that made this inquiry at the attorney general’s
office, it is hard to imagine someone he or she would prefer to write the proffered legal
opinion for that office. But students and commentators would not reasonably perceive this as
the most objective source for such an opinion.
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asserted at one point, moreover, that the mere absence of a specific grant of
power raises a reasonable inference that the exercise of such power is pre-
cluded. It observed that Nevada constitution’s Sec. 6 of Article 11 requires the
Legislature to support the “said university and common schools” by means of
“direct legislative appropriation from the general fund . . . .”73 And from this, it
derives the supposition that “[t]he specific inclusion of common schools and
universities for this type of support might very well imply the exclusion of all
other educational institutions. If the Legislature could otherwise make direct
appropriations, there may have been no need to make this provision in the
Constitution.”74
The opinion supplied no factual or policy basis that would justify reading
the establishment of a duty to “support and maintain” the university and com-
mon schools as a ground for prohibiting the support of other institutions of
higher education. Indeed, it virtually rests on the assumption that the absence of
a grant of power amounts to a prohibition on its exercise, which starts at almost
the opposite place from the general presumption in favor of legislative power.
The AGO makes a similar move to deny legislative power in virtually assuming
that the Board of Regents was to have the central role in establishing policy
concerning the State University.
The AGO underscored that only a limited number of state constitutions
provide for the state’s university to be “controlled” by a Board of Regents, and
then asserted that the Nevada Board is “constitutionally endowed with a sphere
of independence from the legislature in governing higher education.”75 In turn,
relying on earlier Nevada precedent, the opinion contended that “the Board is a
ruler of an independent province beyond the law-making authority of the Legis-
lature.”76 Without question, the Board of Regents was constitutionally charged
with “controlling” the State University, and this does implicitly limit the Legis-
lature’s discretion beyond the decision whether to have a Board of Regents to
administer the University. Even so, the AGO’s last assertion was based on a
misreading (or at least an overreading)—as well as a misquoting—of the
Nevada Supreme Court decision in King v. Board of Regents.77
In King, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the state Legislature violated
an implied prohibition when it created an “advisory board of regents,”78 on the
grounds that such a legislative measure acted to “change, alter, or modify” the
constitutional powers and functions of the Board of Regents.79 The court rea-
soned that a “positive delegation of power to one officer or department implies
a negation of its exercise by any other officer, department, or person.”80 In
73 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
74 AG on Board of Regents, supra note 18.
75 AG on Board of Regents, supra note 18. The opinion virtually ignores that the same
section that says that university is “to be controlled by a Board of Regents” equally provides
that the Board’s “duties shall be prescribed by [l]aw,” referring to statutes adopted by the
state legislature. NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
76 AG on Board of Regents, supra note 18 (misquoting King v. Board of Regents, 200 P.2d
221 (Nev. 1948)).
77 King v. Bd. of Regents, 200 P.2d 221 (Nev. 1948).
78 Id. at 227.
79 Id. at 229.
80 Id. at 232.
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turn, “the whole executive power of the University having been put in the
regents by the people, no part of it can be exercised or put elsewhere by the
Legislature.”81 The court reasoned further that the state’s people, “speaking
through their Constitution, have invested the regents with a power of manage-
ment of which no Legislature may deprive them.”82
Even though the legislature had attempted to make the alternate board
merely advisory, and did not grant its members the power to issue binding
votes, the court reasoned that having a prescribed shadow “adviser” included
too much potential for interference. The advisory board held all the “rights and
privileges of the elected board except the right to a determining vote.”83
So here the right of the regents to control the university, in their constitutional execu-
tive and administrative capacity, is exclusive of such right in any other department of
the government save only the right of the legislature to prescribe duties and other
well recognized legislative rights not here in question.84
Consequently, the appointed advisory board did “change, alter or modify the
constitutional powers and functions of the elected board.”85 While the AGO
read the opinion in King as saying that the state constitution made the Board “a
ruler of an independent province beyond the law-making authority of the Legis-
lature,”86 the Opinion actually said that the court was “not saying that [the
Regents] are the rulers of an independent province or beyond the lawmaking
power of the Legislature.”87 Even so, of course, the court did hold that, with the
“whole executive power of the University having been put in the regents by the
people, no part of it can be exercised or put elsewhere by the Legislature.”88 In
short, King should be read narrowly enough for it to fit together with the
court’s decision in Oakley—recognizing that the power to administer the State
University does not amount to a delegation of authority over higher education
policy for Nevada.89
C. The Pattern of Allocating Power as to Higher Education in Other States
Confirms That the Nevada Legislature Was Intended to Hold Plenary
Powers Over Educational Policy
The state constitutions in the United States rest on similar assumptions and
principles. Thus, as we have noted, the presumption in favor of legislative
power is a principle of universal application. An interpretive challenge in con-
struing the Nevada constitution is precisely that, as noted in the AGO, there are
relatively few states with constitutionally required state universities, let alone
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 235.
84 Id. at 236.
85 Id. at 229 (internal quotations omitted).
86 AG on Board of Regents, supra note 18 (misquoting King, 200 P.2d at 232).
87 King, 200 P.2d at 232 (emphasis added).
88 Id.
89 King and Oakley can readily be brought together so that the legislature’s broad policy-
making role is recognized as consistent with the Board of Regents’ power to administer the
State University. See supra Part II.B.
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constitutional requirements as to the management of the state’s university.90 Of
the constitutions that established state universities, we can learn much from
comparing the Nevada Constitution with the constitutions of Hawaii and
Colorado.
The Hawaii constitution was adopted in 1950, but still contains compara-
ble provisions. As in the Nevada constitution, the University of Hawaii is
“established as the state university,”91 and there is a constitutional provision, as
in Nevada, requiring the creation of a Board of Regents that will hold “jurisdic-
tion over the internal structure, management, and operation of the university.”92
We can learn much, however, from a somewhat distinctive feature of the histor-
ical development of the Hawaii constitution:
One of the suggestions considered at Hawaii’s 1950 Constitutional Convention was
that the board of regents be constitutionally delegated the right to control all publicly
supported higher education in Hawaii,—i.e., the power of statewide coordination. At
the time, such a provision was felt unnecessary as community colleges were only
envisioned and the University of Hawaii itself had only begun its growth. The possi-
bility of statewide control over all public higher education by the board of regents
was left for future legislation.93
Even in 1964, when a system of community colleges was established, it
was placed under the administration of the University of Hawaii’s Board of
Regents by statute rather than by using the constitution.94 Without a constitu-
tional provision delegating control of all publicly supported higher education to
the Board of Regents, it was presumed that the decision to create community
colleges, and to determine their governance, were legislative decisions. When
the Hawaii Legislature turned to making that decision, it followed the same
tracks that the Nevada Legislature has followed to date—it placed the commu-
nity colleges within the existing system of higher education and under the con-
trol of the state’s Board of Regents. Similarly, to date, the Nevada Legislature
has determined, as a matter of policy, to create the NSHE (Nevada System of
Higher Education), and has chosen to place all the state’s universities and col-
leges under that system.
Under Hawaii’s Constitution, one might well have reasoned all the way to
the opposite conclusion—the university was established by the constitution,
and a Board of Regents was required as well. It could have been contended that
the constitutional creation of the university and governing board precluded new
90 AG on Board of Regents, supra note 18 (recognizing eight “constitutionally endowed”
boards of regents in American state constitutions).
91 HAW. CONST. art. X, § 5. Hawaii’s constitutional establishment of the state university is
even stronger than Nevada’s. In Nevada the constitution says that “[t]he Legislature shall
provide for the establishment of a State University . . . .” NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (emphasis
added). In Hawaii, the constitution says: “The University of Hawaii is hereby established as
the state university. . . .” HAW. CONST. art. X, § 5 (emphasis added).
92 HAW. CONST. art. X, § 6.
93 Muriel M. Taira, Part II: Higher Education, in HAWAII CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
STUDIES 1978 99, 118 (Richard F. Kahle, Jr. ed., 1978), available at http://lrbhawaii.org
/concon78/art9.pdf.
94 1964 Haw. Sess. Laws 39–40. Note as well that, even though the legislature determined
to put the administration of the community colleges under the state’s Board of Regents,
those colleges were established by legislation and no one objected that the legislature lacked
authority to establish them.
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institutions of higher education from being governed in any other way. But no
such contention was ever offered, so the issue never even arose. That the com-
munity colleges were placed under the Board of Regents by state statute merely
underscores that the pattern of other states is to leave to the legislature the
flexibility to adjust to changing conditions as needed, or to stay with the tried
and true. The Hawaii Constitution is thus analogous to Nevada’s, but stated
even more emphatically that its creating the university and providing for its
administration “shall not limit the power of the legislature to enact laws of
statewide concern.”95 In both states, the constitution not only ensured that there
would be a state university, but also provided that it would be governed and
administered by a statewide Board of Regents—but without robbing the legis-
lature of its plenary policy-making function.96
The experience in Colorado is equally instructive. Colorado’s Constitution
was originally adopted in 1876, but of course has been amended. The original
Article 8, Section 5 of the state’s constitution created four institutions, includ-
ing one college and a university at Boulder; and Article 9, Section 12 of the
constitution called for the election of a board of regents for the university.
Then, in Article 9, Section 14, the constitution stated that the Board of Regents
“shall have the general supervision of the University, and the exclusive control
and direction of all funds of and appropriations to, the University.”97
In 1984, the Colorado Attorney General issued an opinion to address sev-
eral questions raised by the state’s constitution. That opinion stated that, not-
withstanding the constitutional creation of the board of regents, it was clear that
the legislature could create other boards and institutions beyond what is
expressly stated in the constitution.98 That opinion also addressed the question
of whether the general assembly of Colorado could, despite the control granted
the board over the University of Colorado, still “reorganize higher education”
in the state.99 The opinion’s analysis concluded that, although “the board of
regents itself may not be tampered with without amending the constitution”—
and hence the legislature could not “make locational decisions, and expressly
circumscribe the supervisory powers” of the board of regents—Article 9 still
posed “no identifiable impediments to legislative reorganization of the govern-
ance system of higher education.”100
Similarly, in Colorado Civil Rights Commission v. The Regents of the Uni-
versity of Colorado,101 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the state’s civil
rights commission had jurisdiction to hear a complaint of racial discrimination
in a tenure decision at the University of Colorado. The Regents had filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint because the commission lacked jurisdiction,
and a hearing officer granted the motion based on the view that Article 8, Sec-
tion 5 “grants the Regents general supervisory authority over the University of
95 HAW. CONST. art. X, § 6.
96 See Taira, supra note 93, at 103.
97 COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 14 (repealed 1972).




101 Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 759 P.2d 726 (Colo. 1988).
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Colorado.”102 The Commission itself, however, ruled that it did have jurisdic-
tion, reasoning that the Board of Regents was “not granted unfettered authority
to operate the university,” but the constitution subjects “the university to the
laws and regulations of the state.”103 After a state trial judge reversed the com-
mission, concluding that state legislation must at least make clear that state law
is seeking to regulate the actions of the constitutionally created Regents,104 the
state supreme court agreed with the civil rights commission that a statutory
scheme was “directed against employment discrimination,” and gave the com-
mission power to investigate and adjudicate discrimination claims, and thus
supported its jurisdiction over the Regents.105 It is noteworthy that the Colo-
rado Board of Regents tracked the reasoning of the Nevada board in Board of
Regents v. Oakley.106 In each case, the Board mistakenly construed the consti-
tutionally granted executive power to administer a state institution as granting
the constitutional power to override broad, legislative policymaking to imple-
ment fundamental societal values. As in Colorado, the Nevada legislature
retains the authority to legislate on the fundamental questions of educational
policy in Nevada.
The flexibility that constitutions presumptively grant state legislatures is
nicely illustrated in the 1965 Wyoming case of Goshen County Community
College District v. School District No. 2.107 There the court held that, under the
language of the state constitution, “the legislature has blanket authority and
unlimited constitutional power to provide for the establishment and mainte-
nance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing ‘such
other institutions’ as may be necessary.”108 The Nevada Constitution’s grant of
power to the legislature to create, maintain, and support the “said university and
common schools,”109 and its command to “encourage by all suitable means”
the educational “improvements” in enumerated categories of learning,110 is the
equivalent grant of “blanket authority and unlimited constitutional power to
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform sys-
tem of public instruction.”111
IV. CONCLUSION
Nevada is one of two states where community colleges, four year colleges,
and universities are governed, administered, and funded in the same manner; a
structure that Dr. David F. Damore of Brookings Mountain West has said “hin-
ders the community colleges’ ability to partner with local industries, compete
for workforce training grants, and respond to Nevada’s diverse demographic
102 Id. at 729.
103 Id. (citation omitted).
104 Id. at 730.
105 Id. 
106 Bd. of Regents v. Oakley, 637 P.2d 1199 (Nev. 1981).
107 Goshen Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 399 P.2d 64 (Wyo. 1965).
108 Id. at 66.
109 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
110 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
111 Goshen Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 399 P.2d at 66.
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and economic needs.”112 During the 2013 session of the Nevada Legislature,
Senate Bill 391 passed into law, creating an interim committee to study reforms
to the governance and financing of the state’s community colleges. The original
intention of this bill was to look at restructuring higher education in Nevada to
separate community colleges from the University system.113
As previously noted, it has become commonplace for legal commentators
to cite to a Nevada Attorney General’s opinion114 as though it were established
law,115 even though it erroneously takes the position that schools teaching
courses at the “university level” may not be constitutionally established outside
of the control of the Board of Regents, even by the Legislature. As future bills
are considered that would propose changing the structure of higher education in
Nevada, there should be no question about the legal authority of the Legislature
to establish institutions of higher education and governing boards outside of the
control of the University Board of Regents.
Education in Nevada has such broad reaching consequences for the
state—especially the economy—that little else receives as much attention from
the State Legislature.116 That is precisely why the structure of higher education,
like all broad questions of public policy, was established to be determined by
the Nevada Legislature. Indeed, the general mandate in Article 11, Section 1 of
the Nevada Constitution explicitly states that the “legislature shall encourage by
all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, literary, scientific, mining,
agricultural, and moral improvements . . . .”117 If creating a separate commu-
nity college system is a suitable means to accomplish these goals, the legisla-
tive mandate is clear.
Indeed, the Legislature was constitutionally mandated to “provide for the
establishment of a State University which shall embrace departments for Agri-
culture, Mechanic Arts, and Mining to be controlled by a Board of Regents
whose duties shall be prescribed by Law.”118 This specific requirement to cre-
ate a Board of Regents to control the University no more restricts the Legisla-
ture from creating other universities and boards than the specific requirement
that the University include “[a]griculture, [m]echanic [a]rts, and [m]ining” in
its curriculum prohibits it from also including political science, foreign lan-
guages or any other areas of study it sees fit.
Though the Nevada Constitution does not need to expressly grant any spe-
cific power to the Legislature for anything—because the Legislature has ple-
nary powers119—the Constitution still expressly grants that the Legislature
“shall have power to [establish] [n]ormal schools, and such different grades of
schools, from the primary department to the University, as in their discretion
112 DAVID F. DAMORE, ADVANCING SOUTHERN NEVADA’S REGIONAL PRIORITIES: OVERVIEW
OF THE 77TH SESSION OF THE NEVADA LEGISLATURE 4 (2013), available at http://www.unlv
.edu/sites/default/files/24/BrookingsReport-NVLegislature-Damore-Revised.pdf.
113 Id.
114 See supra Part III.A.
115 See supra Part III.A.
116 DAMORE, supra note 112, at 3–4 (“Perhaps no policy area received more attention dur-
ing the 2013 session than education.”).
117 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (emphasis added).
118 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
119 See supra Part I.A.
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they may deem necessary.”120 The presence of phrases like “as in their discre-
tion” and “all suitable means” in the provisions of the Nevada Constitution’s
section on education, Section 11, was by no means accidental. Emphasizing the
Legislature’s discretion would help ensure that more specific provisions were
not construed to deny generally open-ended powers intended for the Legisla-
ture. In the final analysis, the primary power of the Nevada Legislature is their
discretion in all things “except when powers are specifically denied it by the
Federal Constitution or the State Constitution.”121
120 NEV. CONST., art. XI, § 5.
121 DRIGGS, supra note 4, at 31. As this article was being prepared to go to print, the authors
became aware of a legal memorandum, prepared by the Legislative Counsel Bureau (LCB)
for the benefit of the committee appointed by the legislature to study relevant issues and
make recommendations. The memorandum, written by legal counsel for the LCB, analyzes
the same basic materials and reaches similar conclusions on constitutional issues as those set
forth in this article. See generally Memorandum from Kevin C. Powers, Chief Litig. Coun-
sel, Legislative Counsel Bureau, to Debbie Smith, U.S. Senator, on State Constitutional Mat-
ters Relating to Community Colleges and Higher Education (Mar. 11, 2014) (on file with the
author).
